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CAROL JEAN SHAW, 
vs. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
) 
Plaintiff and ) 
Appellant, 
) 
Case No: 18367 
) 
HAROLD ELIJAH SHAW, 
) 
Defendant and 
Respondent. ) 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF - APPELLANT 
ST A TEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff was divorced from defendant October 11, 1978. (R-216 to 219). The 
decree awarded plaintiff the home with the provision defendant be paid his Y2 equity upon 
her remarriage, provided for payment of $75.00 per month for each of five children living 
with her, provided that the defendant should have the tax deduction for the dependants, 
and provided for the payment of $125.00 per month alimony to be paid for a period of 
three years. Twenty one months later plaintiff remarried. Defendant terminated alimony 
payments and plaintiff commenced an action to recover $1,87 5.00 alimony for the balance 
of the prescribed three years, to recover for certain delinquencies in the payment of child 
support, moved to amend the decree to increase the child support, moved to allow the 
plaintiff to have the tax deductions for the dependant children, and sought to recover 
certain personal property awarded to her but still in the defendant's possession. (R-221 to 
223, 267 to 268, 313 to 317). 
Defendant, contending that the intent of the parties was for the alimony to cease 
upon remarriage of the plaintiff, moved to have the decree amended to specifically 
1 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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provide for such termination, and opposed all other elements of the plaintiff's order to 
show cause and motions. (R-246 to 266, 326 to 331). Both parties asked to be awarded 
attorney fees, and defendant, just two days before the trial, moved to have the court 
determine the equity and order a division of the proceeds of the sale of the home which 
had been sold after the remarriage of the plaintiff. (R-326 to 331). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, December 18, 1982. 
At the conclusion of the trial the court denied the plaintiff's claim for the full three years 
of alimony as provided in the decree and determined that the alimony ceased upon 
plaintiff's remarriage. The court also denied the plaintiff's claim that support payments 
for one son, Neil, who had decided to live with his father when plaintiff remarried, should 
continue until the decree had been modified to eliminate further support; denied the 
plaintiff's request for an increase in the support award from $7 5.00 per month per child 
for the three children still living with her; declined to modify the decree to allow the 
plaintiff to claim the said three children for income tax purposes; and ordered the return 
to the plaintiff of certain minor items of personal property still in the defendant's 
possession. (T-172 to 197, R-361 to 375). 
The court ruled that the money received from the sale of the home should be 
disbursed between the parties after certain adjustments back and forth were made for fix-
up expenses, unpaid child support, rental payments and etc. Plaintiff's counsel was asked 
to prepare the findings, conclusions, and judgment, and to submit them to plaintiff's 
counsel for approval. (T-172 to 197, R-361 to 375). 
For reasons which will be more fully explained in the Statement of Facts, and in the 
arguments to follow, defendant's proposed findings, conclusions, and judgment were 
submitted to the court without the approval of the plaintiff, and plaintiff's own proposals 
were rejected by the court. Plaintiff thereupon obtained a one month extension of time 
to April 4, 1982, in which to file her notice of appeal, (R-376 to 378) and then filed a 
2 
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motion to vacate findings, conclusions and judgment. (R-399 to 401). Again for reasons 
that will be more fully explained hereafter, neither plaintiff nor her counsel appeared for 
the hearing which was set by the court for April 5, and which was three days after she had 
actually filed her notice of appeal. (R-419). 
As a result, the court made and entered certain special findings of facts and 
conclusions of law, (R-473 to 478) and a supplemental order on order to show cause, (R-
453 to 455), in which the court (a) found that plaintiff and her counsel had willfully failed 
to show up at the hearing, (b) found that they had imposed upon the court and opposing 
counsel, (c) attempted to revoke or condition the extension of time to file the notice of 
appeal which had been signed more than one month earlier, (d) denied the plaintiff's 
motions, and (e) awarded $390.00 attorney's fees to the defendant based upon the spurious 
finding that the plaintiff and her lawyer husband (who is not counsel in this case) were 
engaged in a "deliberate effort to try to break the defendant financially, and to use their 
legal position to punish the defendant". (T-11, R-477, 478). 
Plaintiff immediately upon learning of the intended order of the court filed various 
motions and affidavits objecting to the said proposed order which the court rejected out 
of hand upon the ground (among others) that it would not act while the matter was on 
appeal. (R-456 to 457, 472). 
Plaintiff in intervention, Robert L. Lord, filed his motion to intervene, (R-485 to 
487), with supporting affidavits and etc., which the court again rejected out of hand upon 
the ground that it would not act while the matter was on appeal. (R-472). Plaintiff in 
intervention thereupon filed his own notice of appeai. (R-_____ ). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks the following relief: 
(a) An order determining the alimony award to be an award of alimony in gross 
which continues after remarriage of the plaintiff, and granting her judgment for the 
balance of the unpaid alimony in the sum of $1,875.00. 
3 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(b) An order that the child support for the minor son Neil who went to live with his 
father August 1, 1980, should continue to accrue to the benefit of the plaintiff until Neil 
reached his majority August 5, 1981, and granting her judgment therefor in the sum of 
$900.00. 
(c) An order increasing the child support for the three minor children still living 
with the plaintiff from $75.00 per month per child to $200.00 per month per child, and 
providing for a cost of living escalator. 
(d) An order allowing the plaintiff to claim the tax deduction for the said three 
minor children. 
(e) An order properly apportioning the proceeds from the sale of the parties home, 
and giving the plaintiff the proper credits for her offsets, costs, and etc. 
(f) An order vacating all Rulings, Findings, Conclusions, Orders and etc., entered by 
the trial court after the plaintiff's notice of appeal was filed herein. 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff filed for divorce from the defendant on January 16, 1978, upon the ground 
of mental cruelty. (R-199 to 201). At that time plaintiff had the custody of the six 
children born of the marriage, i.e., Richard, age 18, Dale, age 16, Neil, age 14, Troy, age 
10, and the twins, Lynn and Lance, age 7. (R-199). After much correspondence back and 
forth between the attorneys (T-46, 48, 93), after numerous conversations between the 
parties (T-48, 49, 93,), and upon the verbal promise of the defendant that he would pay the 
plaintiff $500.00 per month for three years regardless of what the stipulation said (T-104 
I 
to 107), a stipulation was executed by the parties and their lawyers September 28, 1978. 
(R-208 to 210). 
The stipulation was prepared by plaintiff's attorney, Brent West (T-89, Defendant's 
Exhibit 1 (E)), executed by the parties and their attorneys (R-210), and provided (among 
other things) for the payment of child support for the five minor children in the plaintiff's 
custody of $75.00 per month per child (total $375.00), together with alimony of $125.00 
4 
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per month, making a total payment to the plaintiff by the defendant of $500.00 per 
month. In paragraph five of the stipulation (R-209), defendant agreed that "This alimony 
is to run for a period of three years, beginning October 1, 1978. At the end of that time, 
the plaintiff agrees to permanently waive any future alimony." The provisions of the 
stipulation were incorporated verbatim into the conclusions of law and the decree of 
divorce signed by Judge Hyde. (R-211 to 219). Although the stipulation and the decree 
provided for the payment of child support for the five minor children to age 21 if they 
were attending school full time (R- 209, 213, 217), no provision was made for the oldest 
son Richard for the reason that he had received a call to serve a mission for the L.D.S. 
Church and it was expected that he would be gone for two years or more. (T-26, 30). 
At the time of the divorce, plaintiff was employed as a part time reporter earning 
$150.00 per month (T-69), was receiving grants in unspecified amounts from various 
agencies to help her through college (T-69), and was receiving welfare assistance. (T-69, 
R-268). In addition, of course, she was receiving $500.00 per month from the defendant as 
child support and alimony. Her monthly house payment was $248.00. (R-208, T-26). 
Plaintiff was actually bringing into the household by means of welfare, employment, 
education grants and etc., more than $845.00 per month in addition to the $500.00 alimony 
and support paid to her by the defendant (R-409, 410), but for reasons not clear from the 
record, her trial counsel did not fully develop the evidence on that point. 
The oldest son Rick returned home from his mission within a few months because of 
illness (T-29, R-314). Plaintiff was forced to assume the full responsibility for his support 
inasmuch as the defendant refused to contribute anything. (T-29). Defendant also 
retreated to the letter of the stipulation and the decree of divorce at the earliest 
opportunity. Although he had promised the plaintiff that he would pay her $500.00 per 
month for three years (T-29), he immediately reduced the support by $7 5.00 per month 
when Dale reached 18 years of age and finished high school. (T-29, 30, Defendant's 
Exhibit 5, page 4). After his remarriage, defendant invaded the plaintiff's home without 
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her permission and hauled off certain items of furniture and personal property which had 
been awarded to the plaintiff in the original decree. (T-37, 38, R-216 to 219). 
On July 1, 1980, twenty one months after the decree was signed, plaintiff married 
her present husband, Robert L. Lord, a practicing attorney (T-31, R-247), a situation 
which seems to have offended the defendant, his counsel, and the trial court. See for 
example T-20 line 14, Transcript of April 5 hearing - 5, 1!' 12, R-456, 457. Defendant 
immediately" terminated alimony payments (T-31, R-247, 288, Defendant's Exhibit 5), 
although the decree specifically provided that they were to continue for a period of three 
years. 
Plaintiff and Mr. Lord had purchased a home in Salt Lake City (T-34). The closing 
on the home was not completed until September. (T-34). There was not sufficient room 
for the plaintiff and her five dependants to move into Mr. Lord's apartment, so the two 
older boys, Rick and Neil, volunteered to stay in the family home in North Ogden to watch 
over it and tend the animals until it could be sold. (T-32). 
During the month of July, defendant was obligated pursuant to the terms of the 
divorce decree to pay plaintiff the total sum of $300.00 per month child support for the 
four minor children still living with her. The decree provided that he pay $248.00 directly 
to Mountain West as house payment, and the balance directly to plaintiff. (R-218). He 
made the payment to Mountain West, but did not pay the remaining $52.00 to plaintiff. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, R-247). He paid it instead directly to the two boys, Rick 
and Neil who were living in the North Ogden home. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, R-247, 
T-31, 32). On August 1, 1980, without any prior word to their mother, Rick and Neil 
moved out of the home and began living with the defendant. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 
3, R-247, T-32, 33). 
Although plaintiff was no longer living in the North Ogden home, nor receiving any 
benefit therefrom, defendant made the house payment for the month of August in the 
amount of $248.00 and claimed it as a credit against support, and made no payment at all 
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to the plaintiff. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, T-32). For all intents and purposes, 
defendant had not paid alimony for the months of July and August, was delinquent $52.00 
support for July, and delinquent for all of the support owed for the month of August. 
Upon this state of facts, plaintiff, acting through her then attorney, Robert L. Lord, 
commenced her action to recover support and alimony. (R-221 to 223). Defendant paid 
nothing to the plaintiff for the months of September and October (Defendant's Exhibit 5, 
page 3, T-32, 33), although he made the house payment to Mountain West for which he 
claimed he should be credited for child support. (T-33, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 
3). He also purchased some clothing for the minor children Troy, Lynn and Lance, and 
claimed he should be credited for those purchases ($166.35) as support payments also. (T-
32, R-288, Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3). Beginning with the month of November, 1980, 
defendant resumed payments to plaintiff at the rate of $225.00 per month ($75.00 for 
each of the three minor children still living with the plaintiff), once again breaching the 
verbal agreement he had made with plaintiff to continue payments at the rate of $500.00 
for three years. (Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3). 
Defendant responded to plaintiff's affidavit and order to show cause alleging that he 
had paid all of the support as due and that the alimony was intended to terminate upon 
remarriage of the plaintiff. (R-246 to 266). He also counterattacked by claiming the 
plaintiff and her husband were guilty of abuse of process designed to "harass, annoy, 
threaten and coerce the defendant". (R-249). Defendant, through his attorney, continued 
to attack the character, integrity, and good faith of plaintiff's husband throughout the 
course of the litigation, even after he withdrew as counsel. See for example R-249, 328 
paragraph 6, 329 paragraph 10, 348 paragraph 3, 383, T-20, 22, 23, 60, 98, 100, 142 to 147, 
169, 170. 
Under dates of November 7, 1980, plaintiff moved to modify the decree to increase 
the child support, eliminate the right of the defendant to claim the children for tax 
purposes, and for an award of attorney's fees. (R-267, 268). Partly because of the 
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continuing attacks upon counsel by Mr. Thorne, and because it become apparent he would 
have to be a witness for the plaintiff, Mr. Lord associated Mr. Ronald R. Stanger of Provo 
as co-counsel. (R-295, 296). Mr. Stanger entered his appearance for the record 
December 8, 1980. (R-311). 
In the summer of 1981, defendant, taking his que from the comments and pleadings 
filed by Mr. Thorne, filed a complaint with the Bar Commission (T-99), accusing Mr. Lord 
of unethical practice of law for reasons that have never been made entirely clear. Mr. 
Lord thereupon withdrew August 14, 1981 (R-312), and Mr. Stanger became sole counsel. 
As the time for trial approached, Mr. Stanger became increasingly ill with walking 
pneumonia and was unable to function (R-416, 417), and he asked his associate Mr. Jay 
Fitt to conduct the trial. (R-416, 417). Mr. Stanger assumed responsibility for 
proceedings after the trial (R-417), but was still ill and unable to attend to his full 
responsibilities. (R-417). 
Presumably for that reason, he did not approve or disapprove the defendant's 
proposed findings, conclusions, and order prior to their entry by the court, nor did he 
submit the plaintiff's proposed version on time to have them considered by the court, and 
it became necessary to file a motion to vacate the orders of the court (R-399 to 401), and 
for entry of plaintiff's proposed orders. (R-402 to 415). 
Mr. Stanger applied for and obtained an extension of time to April 4, 1982, in which 
to file the notice of appeal (R-376 to 378, 480, 481), mailed the motion to vacate on 
March 14, (R-399 to 401, 481), and then withdrew. (R-380). Mr. Ronald C. Barker then 
entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff on March 18, 1982, requested an oral 
hearing on plaintiff's motion to vacate and etc., (R-379), and promptly came down with 
the flu which incapacitated him to a greater or lesser extent from March 16, 1982 until 
the first part of April. (R-465, 482). Mr. Barker, however, feeling it to be better strategy 
not to proceed with the motions, (R-466, 482),caused a notice of appeal to be filed April 
2, 1982. (R-419). 
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In the meantime, the court appearently set the plaint if f's motions down for oral 
hearing on April 5, and notified Mr. Barker's office by telephone on or about March 25 
while Mr. Barker was in bed with the flu. (R-456, 465, 482). Neither plaintiff, nor her 
husband were aware of the hearing. (R-466 paragraph 7, 483). Because of some confusion 
about the hearing on the part of plaintiff's counsel (R-465 to 467, 482), neither plaintiff 
nor her counsel showed up for the hearing on April 5, whereupon the court made certain 
rulings and entered the special findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-473 to 478), and 
the supplemental order on order to show cause (R-453 to 455), from which plaintiff 
appeals. 
POINT I 
THE LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF IS PAY-
ABLE IN FULL REGARDLESS OF HER REMARRIAGE. 
APPLICABLE FACTS. Plaintiff was divorced from defendant October 11, 1978. (R-
216 to 219). The decree awarded alimony to the plaintiff in the sum of $125.00 per month 
for a period of three years. The parties had by stipulation settled their alimony, support, 
and property rights, and the stipulation was incorporated verbatim into the decree. 
Paragraph five of the stipulation (R-209), of the conclusions of law (R-214), and the 
decree (R-218), provided as follows: 
"The defendant further agrees to pay to the plaintiff the sum of $125.00 
per month as and for alimony. This alimony is to run for a period of three 
years, beginning October 1, 1978. At the end of that time, the plaintiff agrees 
to permanently waive any future alimony." 
Defendant made the monthly payments for twenty-one months until July of 1980, at 
which time plaintiff remarried. (T-31, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 5). Defendant made no 
further alimony payments contending that they were to terminate upon remarriage. (R-
247, 248, T-31, 113, Defendant's Exhibit 5). Plaintiff thereafter brought her order to show 
cause seeking to hold the defendant in contempt for failure to pay alimony and seeking 
judgment for the past due amounts. (R-221 to 223). 
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LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARD FOR A SPECIFIC SUM CANNOT BE MODIFIED. It 
is abundently clear from the decree in this case that the plaintiff was awarded a specific 
and fixed amount of alimony, i.e., $125.00 for three years, which calculates out to be 
$4,500.00C) Nowhere in the decree, the conclusions, nor in the stipulation upon which the 
decree is based, is there any mention nor hint that the alimony is to terminate upon 
remarriage of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the alimony must be paid in full, 
regardless of the marital status of the plaintiff. The rule is stated in 24 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 
785 as follows: 
"If the divorce court awards alimony in gross, or in a lump sum, without 
reserving the power to amend, the court cannot modify the provision, even 
where it is payable in installments. Even though a statute expressly authorizes 
the divorce court to amend or revise the decree or to make a new decree for 
alimony, the court cannot modify a decree for alimony in gross." 
On page 735, the Am. Jur Cl annotator makes the following unqualified statement 
regarding alimony in gross or lump sum alimony: 
"Alimony in gross, or 'lump-sum alimony', is fundamentally the award of a 
definite sum of money; and if the sum is payable in installments the payments 
run for a definite length of time. The sum is payable in full, regardless of 
future events such as the death of the husband or the remarriage of the wife. 
Gross alimony becomes a vested right from the date of the rendition of the 
judgment, and the manner of its payment in no wise affects its nature or 
ef feet. The fact that the award is payable in installments is not determinative 
of the question whether it is gross or periodic alimony. On the other hand, 
alimony in general, or installment alimony, contemplates periodic payments of 
a definite sum for the indefinite future, and terminates on the death of either 
party or the remarriage of the wife." (Emphasis added.) 
This question is annotated in 127 A.L.R., 241-247, where the principle is again 
reiterated-"Thus, as pointed out in the prior annotation (71 A.L.R., 728), if alimony in a 
lump sum, or 'in gross' is given, subsequent modification is not usually permitted." Nor is 
there any problem with the fact that no specific sum is named in the decree inasmuch as 
it is fixed and definite as to time and can, therefore, be calculated with certainty. 
"Where alimony is awarded as monthly payments to be made for a limited 
period of time, the court has been held not to have the power to modify the 
award by requiring monthly payments for an additional time, and in this 
connection it has been said that the alimony actually allowed is alimony in 
gross, even though the decree does not purport to award a gross sum payable in 
installments." (24 Am. Jur. 2d. p. 786). 
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For example, in the case of Edgar vs. Edgar (Mich.), 115 NW2d. 286, it was held that 
an award of $125.00 per month for two years constituted a lump sum award and could not 
be modified. 
LUMP SUM ALIMONY AW ARD CONSTITUTES JUDGMENT LIEN IN UT AH.. The 
Utah Court has long recognized the principle. In Beesley vs. Badger (Utah, 1925), 240 P. 
458, the plaintiff Beesley had purchased some real property from the defendant Badger 
and taken title by warranty deed. Badger had previously been divorced and was ordered to 
pay permanent (indeterminate) alimony and $80.00 per month child support. Although 
there was no allegation that he was in arrears, the plaintiff maintained that the decree 
was a final in personum judgment and constituted a lien against the real property of the 
defendant (and, therefore, a violation of the covenant in the warranty deed) by virtue of 
the judgment lien statute. The court, recognizing the difference between a lump sum 
award and an award of an indeterminate or indefinite amount, and referring to its 
previous quotes from 19 C.J. p. 313, held as follows: 
"When no such lien is declared or impressed by the decree itself, we, from 
the texts and the cases there cited, and from the statute, deduce and declare 
this to be the rule: When a divorce is granted and the husband ordered to pay 
alimony or to support minor children or both, / and the decree itself does not 
declare or impress a lien to secure such payments, then, by force of the 
statute relating to judgments in general, such decree or judgment from the 
filing and docketing thereof becomes and has all the force and ef feet of a lien 
to the same extent as an ordinary judgment for money, when the decree for 
alimony is in a gross sum, though payable partly or wholly in future 
installments, and when not a gross sum but, as here, in installments for an 
indefinite period, the decree is a lien securing payment of all due and unpaid 
installments, but not of installments to become due in the future." (Emphasis 
added). 
The court said that a judgment or decree awarding alimony in gross, even though 
payable in future installments is a judgment for a sum certain and would constitute a lien 
upon the real property of the obligor, and went on to expound upon the diff ere nee between 
a lump sum award which would constitute a lien, and periodic alimony with no termination 
date which would not constitute a lien. The obvious premise throughout the argument is 
that the lump sum award is final and fixed for a specific amount, and hence not subject to 
modification at a later date. 
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LUMP SUM ALIMONY AWARD DOES NOT TERMINATE UPON RE- MARRIAGE IN 
UTAH. In the case of Austad vs. Austad (Utah, 1954), 2 Utah 2d. 40, 269 P.2d. 284, this 
court had before it the question of whether indeterminate alimony (or alimony for an 
indefinite amount) automatically terminated upon the remarriage of the wife. In 
overruling the case of Myers vs. Myers (62 Utah 90, 218 P. 123), which had held that 
alimony did not automatically terminate upon remarriage the court reasoned thusly: 
"The case of King vs. King (38 Ohio St. 370), is important to the problem 
we are considering. It seems to present the real situation from which the 
Myers rule originated. There the award was for a lump sum of $1,000.00 as 
permanent alimony, payable in monthly installments. It was held that the 
remarriage did not cut off the wife's right to receive the full amount of the 
award even though some of the installments remained to be paid after the 
subsequent marriage. This rule is perfectly sound and logical when applied to 
the facts in the King case, but the error apparently has come about in applying 
it where the award was not for a lump sum but merely for indefinite current 
support. The clear distinction which obviously exists between these two 
situtions has received judicial recognition. The courts of Illinois and Georgia 
hold that where the alimony is in a lump sum payable in installments there is 
no automatic termination on the wife's remarriage; and that this creates an 
absolute right to the amount so awarded, but indicate that where the alimony 
is strictly for the current support of the wife, without limit as to the total 
amount or the number of installments, remarriage of the wife automatically 
ends her right to such alimony. This distinction is also suggested in the 
Oklahoma case of Gilcrease vs. Gilcrease." (Emphasis added). For cases 
referred to in the above quote, recognizing the distinction, see Dobson vs. 
Dobson, 320 Ill. App. 687, 51 N.E. 2d. 1010; Morgan vs. Lowman, 80 Ill. App. 
557; Green vs. Starling, 203 Ga. 10, 45 S.E.2d. 188; White vs. Murden, 190 Ga. 
536, 9 S.E.2d. 745; Gilcrease vs. Gilcrease, 186 Okl. 451, 98 P.2d. 906, 127 
A.L.R., 735. 
From the foregoing analysis, the court held that alimony for an indefinite amount 
automatically terminated upon remarriage of the wife, and made the following comment: 
"In reaching this decision we are not to be understood as holding that the same result 
would eventuate where a sum of alimony was decreed in lieu of dower, or in settlement of 
property rights, or where the alimony is awarded in a lump sum payable in install-
ments." (Emphasis added). 
Without further elaboration, it seems abundently clear that the rule in the State of 
Utah is that periodic alimony for an indefinite term automatically terminates upon the 
remarriage of the wife, but that alimony awarded in gross either for a specific amount or 
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for a definite and stated length of time (which is the same thing) is payable in full even 
though some installments remain to be paid after the remarriage of the wife. In this case 
defendant owes plaintiff an additional fifteen months of alimony at $125.00 per month, or 
a total of $1,875.00. 
DECREE IS FINAL AND CANNOT BE MODIFIED FOR PRESUMED CLERICAL OR 
JUDICIAL ERROR. There remains one additional issue that should be addressed in regard 
to this point. After the plaintiff had commenced her post judgment action to enforce the 
alimony and support obligations of the defendant, defendant, on October 29, 1980, more 
than two years after the entry of the decree, filed his amended response, (R-246 to 266) 
wherein he, for the first time in this action, called into question the alimony provision of 
the October, 1978 decree. On pages 249 and 250 of the record, defendant seeks to amend 
the decree on the basis of a clerical ert:'or under Rule 60 (a), or to "Reform" the decree to 
conform to the understanding of the parties. The matter was tried to the court on this 
issue over the objections of the plaintiff. (T-44, 45, 103). 
It is clear that the trial court erred in taking any evidence on this point over the 
objections of the plaintiff, and that he was just as obviously in error when he amended the 
judgment nunc pro tune to provide that the alimony should cease upon remarriage of the 
plaintiff. 46 Am. Jur. 2d. at page 318 states that the obvious purpose of a judgment is to 
"show the litigants and other persons interested in the cause that the judge has arrived at 
a decision, and what that decision is; it is this reflection of the judge's state of mind that 
makes the judgment effective." 
Rule 60 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "clerical mistakes" in 
judgments may be corrected at any timee Rule 60 (b) provides for all other instances in 
which a party may obtain relief from a final judgment. The defendant simply does not fit 
into either category. The case of Richards vs. Siddoway (Utah, 1970), 24 Utah 2d. 314, 
471 P.2d. 143, is controlling and dispositive on this point. In that case seven of eight heirs 
of one William H. Siddoway, deceased, had entered into a stipulation for the partition of 
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the real property of the deceased. The stipulation apparently provided that the fee simple 
to a portion of the land should be awarded to three of the heirs, and that the fourth should 
take a life estate with remainder over to his only child, Elaine. During his lifetime, 
Elaine's father conveyed away his interest in the land. After his death Elaine brought suit 
to establish her life estate in the land and to recover possession. The defendants moved 
to correct a "clerical error" in the judgment and to amend the judgment to grant the fee 
to Elaine's father (thereby depriving her of her life estate) upon the ground that that was 
the intention of the signatories on the stipulation. The court took testimony and 
apparently found that to be the intention of the parties and granted the motion to amend 
the judgment nunc pro tune. Plaintiff appealed. 
On appeal, Justice Ellett, writing for the unanimous court, and referring to 49 
C.J.S., Judgments Section 238, held that after the time provided in Rule 60 (b) the 
judgment was no longer open to "any amendment, revision, modification, or correction 
which involves the exercise of the judgment or discretion of the court on the merits or on 
matters of substance." 
"The only amendment then permissible is one which is intended to make 
the judgment speak the truth by showing what the judicial action really was, 
and not one which corrects judicial errors, or remedies the'effects of judicial 
nonaction; the court has no power at such time to revise and amend a 
judgment by correcting judicial errors, and making it express something which 
the court did not pronounce, and did not intend to pronounce, in the first 
instance. Judicial errors in judgments are to be corrected by appeal or writ of 
error, or by certiorari, or by awarding a new trial, or by any means specially 
provided by statute, and not by amendment, unless the statute permits such 
amendment." 
The court then went on to point out that the distinction between a judicial error and 
a clerical error does not depend upon who made it, but, rather, it depends upon whether it 
was made in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. It pointed 
out that in that case, the judgment as rendered, even if it should be at variance with the 
intention of the parties, or even of the stipulation itself, could not be amended as a 
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clerical error since it obviously was the judgment of the court no matter how erroneously 
it may have been made. 
The court stated that the only remedy open to the defendants was to make the 
appropriate motions under the then equivalent of Rule 60 (b) which at that time provided 
that the motions must be made within a reasonable time of not more than six months 
after rendition of the judgment. Inasmuch as they had not done so the court had no 
jurisdiction after that time to vacate the order. 
"By numerous decisions of this court it is settled that a judgment, not void 
on its face, cannot in the same proceedings by motion, be opened or vacated 
by the court which rendered it, except within six months after the adjourn-
ment of the term at which the judgment was rendered. * * * * * * * 
* * * * * * * * * * 
"The rule applicable is wholesome and necessary. There must be an end to 
the time when judgments can be questioned. 
"In this case the protestant had a remedy by motion for a new trial and 
also by appeal, but she permitted the time limited by law therefore to lapse 
without seeking either. Nearly a year after the adjournment of the term at 
which the proceedings were had, she, by a motion, attempted to avoid the 
judgment upon extrinsic grounds. It is a case plainly within the rule which 
denies jurisdiction of a court to open or vacate its judgments under such 
circumstances." 
APPLICATION TO PLAINTIFF. So also in this case. Defendant Harold Shaw and his 
attorney executed the Stipulation (R-208 to 210), upon which the decree of divorce was 
based. The provisions of the stipulation were incorporated into the Conclusions of Law 
(R-211 to 215), and ultimately into the Decree of Divorce (R-216 to 219). Clearly then 
the decree follows the conclusions of law, which obviously follows the stipulation. 
Whatever the intention of the parties may have been, the presumed error is not a clerical 
error which can be remedied under Rule 60 (a). If it is a judicial error, it could only be 
remedied under Rule 60 (b) and must be brought within four months of the entry thereof. 
Only the defendant and his lawyer knew of any mistake in the stipulation and they chose 
not to correct it (plaintiff contends the intention was for the alimony to be paid in full 
regardless of her remarriage. T-48, 49, 90, 91, 92) rather, contenting themselves only 
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with correction of a minor item concerning the date of separation. (Defendant's Exhibit 
"B"). 
POINT II 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO THE SUPPORT ACCRUING FOR THE MINOR CHILD NEIL 
FROM THE TIME NEIL VOLUNTARILY MOVED IN WITH THE DEFENDANT 
UNTIL HE REACHED HIS EIGHTEENTH BIRTHDAY (12 MONTHS). 
APPLICABLE FACTS. The divorce decree of October 11, 1978 (R-211 to 219), 
provided for the payment to the plaintiff of $75.00 per month for each of the five minor 
children then living with her. (R-217). Twenty two months later on August 1, 1980, (one 
month after plaintiff's remarriage), one of the minor children, Neil, who turned 17 years 
of age on August 5, voluntarily and without prior word to his mother, moved out of the 
plaintiff's home in North Ogden, and into the home of his father, the defendant herein. 
(R-247, T-32, 33, 34). 
Defendant terminated further support payments for Neil as of August 1, 1980. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 3, R-247, T-34). By means of an order to show cause issued 
September 9, 1980 (R-221 to 223), plaintiff moved to have the defendant found in 
contempt and to reduce the support arrearages to judgment. Although the question of 
delinquent support for Neil was not raised directly in the order or the supporting affidavit, 
the issue was tried to the court without opposition from the defendant. (R-344, 365, T-19, 
20, 34, 35, 52). 
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FOR NEIL AS MATTER OF LAW UNTIL 
DECREE IS MODIFIED. The question here presented, i.e., whether the father should be 
given credit for payments made in support of minors in the legal custody of the mother 
while they are living with him and presumably being supported by him, has been the 
subject of endless litigation over the years. See 47 A.L.R., 3rd. 1024 et. seq., and the 
cases collected therein. The 47 A.L.R., 3rd. annotation, at page 1035 in its opening 
comments makes the following observation: 
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"While the subject matter of this annotation is such as to discourage the 
formulation of general rules, since the particular circumstances involved 
appear to be controlling in most cases, it can be generally stated that most 
cases have gravitated toward the view that a father should not be allowed, as 
a matter of law, credit for expenditures made while the child is in his custody 
or for other voluntary payments made on behalf of the child which do not 
specifically conform to the terms of the decree." (Emphasis added.) 
And again, on page 1039: 
"Most of the courts that have been faced with the issue of whether or not 
to give a father credit against child support payment arrearages for expenses 
accruing where the child was in his custody, or for other voluntary expendi-
tures made by him on the child's behalf, have taken the position that the 
father is not entitled, as a matter of law, to credit for such voluntary 
expenditures when they are made in a manner other than that specified by the 
support order or divorce decree." (Emphasis added.) 
The annotator then cites cases in support of the proposition from Arkansas, 
California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Lousiana, Maryland, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and 
Washington. 
REASONS FOR RULE. Various rationals have been given by the courts for denying 
the father credit even though the child is in his home and being supported by him. Some 
courts have reasoned that to permit the father credit for voluntary payments would be the 
equivalent of allowing him to vary the terms of the decree at will, and to deprive the 
mother of the right to determine the manner in which the support monies should be spent. 
See for example, Openshaw vs. Openshaw (1935), 86 Utah 229, 42 P .2d. 191. Other 
reasons given for the rule are that the right to the payments becomes vested when they 
are due, have essentially ripened into judgment (or the right to judgments) as they become 
due, and the court, therefore, has no power to modify the decree except in futuro. For 
example, in the widely quoted case of Bradley vs. Fowler (Wash., 1948), 192 P .2d. 969, 
the defendant had the children in his custody for a period of five weeks during which he 
supported them and (in addition) expended $125.00 for medical attention and clothing etc. 
The trial court and the appellate court both agreed that defendant was not relieved of his 
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obligation to pay support during the five weeks that the child was in his custody· The 
appellate court observed: 
"We are therefore of the opinion that, under the specific provisions of the 
final decree, respondent was required to pay to appellant the sum of twenty-
five dollars per week during the period hereunder consideration, regardless of 
the fact that he had the children in his custody." 
The court went on to observe that even a court of equity, in an effort to do equity, 
cannot disregard the provisions of a lawful decree, nor would the court be justified in 
offsetting against payments required under the decree, voluntary payments made while 
the children were in the defendant's custody. 
PARTICULAR APPLICATIONS OF RULE. Among those circumstances in which the 
courts have refused to allow the father credit against arrearages of child support accruing 
while he had the child in his "custody" and supported him during such time, the following 
are examples: 
(a) Where the husband takes custody on his own initiative. In the case of 
Mccourtney vs. Mccourtney (Ark., 1943) 168 S.W.2d. 200, the court held that credit could 
not be allowed to the husband for his expenses in supporting one of three children awarded 
to the wife in the decree during the time he had the child in his "custody". He had 
accomplished the change of custody from the divorced wife without her consent, on his 
own initiative, and contray to the order of the court. 
"The court stated that the husband was not entitled to this credit for the reason that 
he was a volunteer in taking this child into his custody, and that he become such when he 
took the child into his custody in violation of the court order." 47 A.L.R., 3rd. at 1048, 
referring to Mccourtney vs. Mccourtney. 
(b) Where the husband takes the child without the consent of the mother. In the 
matter of Eileen Baures vs. Jack Baures (Ariz., 1970), 478 P.2d. 130; 47 A.L.R., 3rd. 
1024, the court held, inter alia, that since the wife neither expressly nor impliedly 
consented to any mode of payment other than that called for in the divorce decree, the 
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husband was not entitled to credit against the arrearages that accrued during the fourteen 
months that the child was in his "custody". 
(c) Where the mother is ill and unable to care for the child. In Boyle vs. Boyle, 
(1967, Fla. App.), 194 So.2d. 64, referred to in 47 A.L.R., 3rd. at 1050, the father was not 
allowed to deduct $100.00 in support that had accured while he had the child as a result of 
the mother's illness. The court stated that the rule generally applied in such cases is that 
when default has occurred in payment of installments of child support under a decree that 
has become final, the sums unpaid constitute vested property rights which the wife cannot 
be deprived of except by due process of law. 
(d) Where the child prefers to live with the father. In this regard, the 47 A.L.R., 
3rd. annotation at page 1051 makes the following unqualified statement: 
"Credit against child support arrearages has generally been denied for 
support expense incurred by the father when the child, for one reason or 
another, decides to leave the custody of the mother and live with the father. 
In these cases the courts generally take the position that since such a change 
in custody is without the mother's consent and in violation of the decree, the 
father still remains obligated to make support payments according to the 
terms of the decree, and that the father, in caring for the child in a manner 
other than that specified by the decree, merely acts as a volunteer." 
Of particular interest along this line is the case of Klimasewski vs. Klimasewski, 
(1960, R.I.), 162 A.2d. 549. In that case the mother had been awarded custody of five 
minor children and the father was ordered to pay $5.00 per week support for each of the 
children. At one time or another all five of the children went to live with the father 
without the permission of the mother. During the time the father had them with him he 
deducted $5.00 per week for each child in his "custody". The court refused to allow him 
credit against the arrearages and held that to allow him such credit would amount to an 
impermissable retroactive modification of the decree. 
Compare the case of Baures vs. Baures, (Supra), holding that the father was not 
entitled to credit against the arrearages which had accrued during the time he had the 
child living with him. 
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"A father who is required to make periodic payments for the support of 
minor children has an opportunity to relieve himself of that liability by a 
petition to modify the decree in futuro but he cannot remain silent while the 
installments accrue and then claim credit for his voluntary acts. In view of 
the mandatory requirements of the divorce decree as to payments of the 
monthly installments to appellant, although it is to appellee's credit that he 
cared for his daughter, he was a volunteer and is not thereby relieved from the 
obligation of the decree." 
THE UT AH RULE. The Utah court finds itself in good company with the majority 
by refusing to allow, as a matter of law, credit to the father for expenditures made by 
him to support the child during the time that he had it contrary to the terms of the 
decree, or to allow any credit toward the arrearages that accrued in favor of the mother 
during such time. The Utah court (along with many of the others) has not entirely closed 
the door, however, where the father can show that the mother consented to the alternate 
manner of payment, AND where there is no injustice to the mother, AND where the 
particular circumstances otherwise so justify, credit may be allowed. See Openshaw vs. 
Openshaw (1935), 86 Utah 229, 42 P .2d. 191, Anderson vs. Anderson (1946), 172 P .2d. 132, 
and Stanton vs. Stanton (1974), 30 Utah 2d. 315, 517 P.2d. 1010, all refusing to allow the 
father credit even though he had the "custody" of the child and supported him during the 
time the arrearages accured. 
In Anderson vs. Anderson, the court said: 
"There is no dispute as to the fact that defendant did not fully comply 
with the decree. He could not properly ignore any provisions therein pending 
modification. Under the remedial powers of the court, the defendant could 
have been held in contempt for wilful non-compliance with the decree. We see 
no reason why the court could not likewise require him to pay a sum equal to 
the installments which had been unpaid. The court was doubtless reluctant to 
specifically hold defendant in contempt when the plaintiff had told him she did 
not want any more money from him when she remarried. She could not waive 
the right of the two children who did remain with her to be supported by 
defendant as required by the decree. There is no showin that durin the three 
months in controversy the total sum of 225.00 was not a reasonable sum for 
the support of the two minor children, even if plaintiff's second marriage and 
the voluntary departure of Gary from her home are also considered." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Stanton vs. Stanton (1974), supra, a case which was ultimately before the court 
three times and the United States Supreme Court twice on the question of unconstitu-
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tional discrimination where the age of majority was fixed at 18 for girls and 21 for boys, 
the court continued in effect its policy of not allowing credit toward arrearages which 
accrued during the time the father had the children in his home contrary to the terms of 
the decree, stating: 
"There is an adjunctive minor issue in this case: defendant contends that 
the son Rick lived with him for about three months and that he is therefore 
entitled to a credit of $300.00 for Rick's support during that time. The 
general rule is that the decree fixes the obligations of the parties; and that 
they cannot modify it or change their obligations by their conduct. Otherwise 
sometimes interfamily tensions and mechanations could make a shambles of 
determining and enforcing the rights and duties of the parties. 
"In the absence of any modification of the decree, the support money 
accrued in accordance with its terms; and it was not the prerogative of the 
defendant to unilaterall decide that he would not a the su ort mone and 
offset it by favors conferred upon the children." Emphasis added. 
APPLICATION TO PLAINTIFF. So far as the instant case is concerned, it is 
apparent that Neil moved from the home in North Ogden into his father's home without 
the knowledge nor consent of the plaintiff. (T-32, 33, R-247). Plaintiff did not expressly 
nor impliedly consent to any form of payment at variance with the terms of the decree, 
nor did the defendant take any steps to seek modification of the decree to eliminate the 
support for Neil. (R-250). 
Anticipating that Neil would be living with her, plaintiff purchased a home in Salt 
Lake City. (T-34). Costs for mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, utilities, heat, and 
other shelter costs amounted to $11,232.11 in 1981. (Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). Whether 
Neil lived there or whether he didn't made no appreciable difference in the amount of 
those overhead costs. The fact that plaintiff was no longer directly supporting Neil did 
not entitle defendant to a pro rata reduction in his support obligation (Anderson vs. 
Anderson, supra), and the total monthly support for the three children remaining with the 
plaintiff, together with the sum owing for Neil only amounts to $300.00, or $100.00 per 
month per child if it is apportioned to the remaining children-certainly not an 
unreasonable amount of support in any event. To deny her judgment for the very paltry 
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sum of $900.00 would work a substantial injustice upon the plaintiff~ 47 A.L.R., 3rd. 1041, 
paragraph 4. 
POINT Ill 
PLAINTIFF DEMONSTRATED SUFFICIENT CHANGE OF CIR CU MST ANCES TO 
WARRANT INCREASE IN MONTHLY CHILD SUPPORT AWARD. 
APPLICABLE FACTS. At the time of plaintiff's divorce from defendant in October, 
1978, she was employed as a part time reporter earning $150.00 per month (T-69, R-365), 
was receiving grants in unspecified amounts from various agencies to help her through 
college (T-69), and was receiving welfare assistance. (T-69, R-268). In addition, of 
course, she was receiving $500.00 per month from the defendant as child support and 
alimony. Her monthly house payment was $248.00. (R-208, T-26). As the trial court itself 
observed (T..,176), the $500.00 awarded to her was hardly enough to support her and the 
five children, and it becomes apparent that the difference was made up primarily from 
the welfare and other agency grants. 
Defendant was earning $15,313.40 per year at the time of the divorce (R-366), 
making his total contribution to the support of his family 3996 of his income. The decree 
awarded the use and possession of the home to the plaintiff with the provision that it must 
be sold upon her remarriage. (R-217). On July 1, 1980, plaintiff remarried, thereby 
triggering the requirement that the home be sold. (T-31, 113, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 
5, page 4). At the time the plaintiff's order to show cause was filed in September, 1980 
(R-223), plaintiff and her new husband were in the process of purchasing a home in Salt 
Lake City (T-34). The older son Dale had reached his majority and was no longer living 
with the plaintiff (T-21, 28, 29, 51, 67), and the next older son Neil was living with his 
father, having moved in with him August 1, 1980. (T-32, 33, R-247, Defendant's Exhibit 5, 
page 4). Defendant had terminated alimony payments and had terminated support for 
... Dale and Neil, leaving the plaintiff with only $225.00 per month total support for the 
three younger children still living with her. (T-31, R-247, 248, Defendant's Exhibit 5, page 
4). 
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At the time of the hearing in December, 1981, defendant demonstrated, and the 
court found, that he was earning approximately $19,000.00 per year, (R-366), or an 
increase of "almost $4,000.00" as observed by the court in its ruling from the bench. (T-
178). The court will note that defendant was then paying only 14% of his income to the 
plaintiff to support the three children still in her custody. Plaintiff, on the other hand 
was spending 165% of her income to support the children. See page 30 herein. Defendant 
had also remarried (T-118), claimed to be supporting two minor children of his new wife, 
(T-118, Defendant's Exhibit 3), and had two of the older children (Rick and Neil who were 
both over 18 years old and gainfully employed), living with him and which he claimed to be 
supporting. (T-34, 35, 67, 134, Defendant's Exhibit 3). 
Plaintiff, on the other hand, had graduated from college, had been employed as a 
teaching intern and as a pre-school teacher and had earned a gross salary for 1981 of 
$6,276.71, and a net of $5,165.16. (R-365, Plaintiff's Exhibit "A"). 
CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRED. Plaintiff contends that the trial court 
misapplied the law and grossly abused its discretion by finding that there had not been a 
sufficient change of circumstan~e to increase the support for the three children remaining 
in the custody of the plaintiff. There is no question that as a general rule, there must be 
some material change of circumstances since the entry of the decree of divorce in order 
for the court to modify the decree. Anderson vs. Anderson, (1962), 13 Utah 2d. 36, 368 
P.2d. 264; Gale vs. Gale 233 U. 277, 258 P.2d. 986. The principle is easy to enunciate, 
but the application is more difficult. The question, as always, boils down to a 
determination as to what constitutes a sufficient change of circumstances. In 1981 this 
court had before it the case of Foulger vs. Foulger, 626 P .2d. 412. In that case the court 
observed that modifications of real property awards should be made only upon a showing 
of "compelling reasons arising from substantial and material change in circumstances." 
Significantly, however, on page 414 of the Pacific Reporter, the court said that the rule 
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should not be as rigidly applied where modification of a support and alimony award is at 
issue. 
"The change in circumstance required to justify a modification of the 
decree of divorce varies with the type of modification contemplated. Pro-
vision in the original decree of divorce granting alimony, child support, and the 
like must be readily susceptible to alternation at a later date, as the needs 
which such rovisions were desi nated to fill are sub·ect to ra id and 
unpredictable change." Emphasis added. 
Such a view of the circumstances under which awards of alimony and support should 
be modified is entirely consistent with the view expressed by the Alabama court in the 
case of Womble vs. Womble (197 5), 321 So.2d. 660: 
"The conditions and circumstances of the parties, though pertinent, are 
not the controlling criteria in determining the changed needs of the children. 
It is the material change in the needs, conditions and circumstances of the 
children that is the most pertinent in considering modification of a decree of 
sup~ort. That factor coupled with the father's financial ability to meet such 
nee s determines the basis for modification." (Emphasis added.) 
CHANGES AND NEEDS SHOWN BY PLAINTIFF. A careful examination of the oral 
testimony and the record in this matter will show that the trial court erred in almost 
every particular pertaining to the change of circumstances of the parties and of the 
changed needs of the children. 
(a) General Increase in the Cost of Living and in the Cost of Raising the Children. 
Counsel for the defendant observed that the overall cost of living had gone up and that 
the court was very much aware of it. (T-78). Plaintiff's attorney, in his remarks at the 
conclusion of his case in chief, and in his concluding arguments to the court asked the 
court to consider the general increase in the cost of living and of the rising cost of 
supporting the minor children as a result of their advancement in years, with the 
attendant increase in the cost of their clothing, amount of food consumed, activities they 
involve themselves in, and etc. (T-110, 164). The plaintiff asked the court to take judicial 
notice of the double digit inflation throughout the general economy during the three years 
since the entry of the decree, and requested a specific finding that a 3096 increase in the 
cost of living does not (in line with the court's refusal to increase the support), constitute 
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a sufficient change of circumstances to modify the support award. (R-413). The court 
ref used to sign the proposed findings. 
Numerous cases and authorities could be cited for the proposition that the court can 
and should take judicial notice of matters which are within the common knowledge of an 
interested public. See for example in re Marriage of Wilden (Colo., 1977), 563 P .2d. 384. 
There is no question of the common knowledge of the general public that there had been 
double digit inflation during the three years since the decree had been entered leading to 
a general increase in the cost of living of at least 3096. On that basis alone, the 
purchasing power of $7 5.00 per child awarded to the plaintiff had been reduced by 3096 to 
an equivalent in 1978 dollars of only $52.50 - a mere pittance. Just to maintain the 
purchasing power of the award as made, it would have to be increased by 3096 to $97 .50. 
If there had been no evidence of need or changed circumstances of the parties at all, t!'le 
court was obligated to increase the support to at least $97 .50, and failure to do so 
constitutes an abuse of discreation, and creates a condition of extreme inequity for the 
plaintiff. It is ridiculous in the extreme to contemplate payment (in 1978 dollars) of only 
$52.50 per child for three children when the defendant was earning in 1978, over 
$15,000.00 per year. 
In the case of Womble vs. Womble, supra, the Alabama court had before it the wife's 
petition for increase in the child support award for two children from $150.00 per month 
per child. Five years had passed since the entry of the last modification in 1970, and the 
defendant was earning approximately $18,000.00 per year. Evidence was submitted by the 
plaintiff concerning the increased cost of raising the children. The trial court determined 
that there had been no showing of a material change of circumstances beyond that 
contemplated by the last modification in 1970, and refused to modify the award. The 
appeals court held that it was an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court not to 
judicially notice the general increased level of the cost of living. The court said: 
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"It is a matter for judicial recognition that the sum of $150.00 per month 
has markedly lost purchasing power since 1970. It is further un.disputed t~at 
because of advanced age and activity, the cost of feeding, clothing, supplying 
school equipment and furnishing other needs of growing boys has increased." 
See also Beck vs. Walker (Ariz., 1979), 604 P .2d. 18, wherein the court said that it 
was a matter of common knowledge that the cost of living had substantially increased 
since 1973, and having shown that the defendant's ability to pay had also increased, it was 
proper for the court to increase the child support award. So also in this case. The overall 
general increase in the cost of living since entry of the decree, in and of itself, 
constitutes sufficient change of circumstances to require the trial court to increase the 
level of support. 
(b) Increased Housing Expense. At the time of the divorce in 1978, plaintiff's 
mortgage expense was $248.00 per month. Plaintiff remarried July 1, 1980, and, pursuant 
to the terms of the decree of divorce, was required to sell the house, which she did. (T-
54, R-217). Prior to her remarriage, plaintiff and her soon to be husband purchased a 
home in Salt Lake City for $80,000.00. (T-34, 79, 97). The home was purchased with the 
expectation that the two older boys, Rick and Neil would also live with the plaintiff. (T-
34,80). The uncontroverted testimony of the plaintiff and her husband was to the effect 
that the house was smaller than the one sold in North Ogden, had only one bedroom on the 
main floor, and three bedrooms in the finished basement, and was just barely adequate for 
their needs (T-79); that it was in a reasonably good middle class neighborhood (T-97); and 
was the result of diligent search throughout the Salt Lake County area for suitable 
housing. (T-97). Plaintiff's husband testified (T-98) that to find a house in the Salt Lake 
area equivalent to the home plaintiff was forced to sell in North Ogden would cost 
upwards of $120,000.00 to $130,000.00. 
The uncontroverted facts showed that the plaintiff (together with her new husband) 
was expending $9,660.00 per year for mortgage payments, plus an additional $1,572.11 for 
heat, lights, water, telephone, and etc., for a total shelter cost of $11,232.11. (T -83 to 
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86, Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). Since there were two adults and three minor children residing 
in the home, plaintiff attributed 3/ 5 of the cost to the children for a total of $6,739.26. 
Defendant's total contribution amounts to only $2,700.00 per year-less than one-half of 
even the shelter costs. 
Much is made of the plaintiff's "voluntary" increase in living costs by the court. For 
example, contrary to the evidence, the court states on page 176 of the transcript that 
"While necessity may have required that they get a larger house for the children that 
would be more expensive than the apartment Mr. Lord was currently renting, there is 
nothing that required them, of course, to buy an $80,000.00 home by which a major 
portion of this child support is added on here". Beginning on page 177 the court says: "All 
of this that I am saying pursuades the court, however, that though the plaintiff's expenses 
have gone up considerably, they (have) voluntarily gone up ••• " The court then goes on 
to expound on how one naturally spends to the limit and cites examples of one having a 
$100,000.00 income, a $50,000.00 income, a $25,000.00 income and etc., clearly implying 
that remarriage to a lawyer had made plaintiff wealthy and she was spending accordingly. 
It should be noted that the court had ruled that the income of the plaintiff's husband was 
immaterial and would not be considered by him, and hence plaintiff's trial counsel did not 
put on any evidence of the husband's depressed earnings, although he had started out to do 
so. (T-86, 87). 
It appears to this writer that the court has applied a double standard to the plaintiff. 
The defendant may (apparently) voluntarily increase his housing costs, voluntarily marry 
and take on the obligation to support his step children, voluntarily support his adult 
children who were gainfully employed and fully capable of supporting themselves, increase 
his other costs and expenses voluntarily, etc., and then use that as an excuse to avoid 
paying even a minimumly adequate amount for the support of his own minor children. 
Just how voluntary has the increase in the living expenses of the plaintiff actually 
been? If she be afforded the same right of remarriage as the defendant, it follows that all 
27 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
increases ref erred to in this case pretty much follow as a matter of course, and because 
of the provision in the decree which required the plaintiff to sell her home upon 
remarriage. She actually had no choice in the matter, except the original choice to marry 
or not to marry. Once that choice had been made, she was obligated to sell the house in 
North Ogden and purchase another. Testimony clearly showed that a good faith effort had 
been made to find suitable housing at an affordable price; that housing costs in the Salt 
Lake area were approximately double what they were in the North Ogden area and so 
forth. The court, in accordance with the principles of in re Marriage of Wilden, supra, 
should take judicial notice of the steep escalation of housing costs in the Salt Lake market 
as well. 
An unbiased evaluation of the evidence in this matter will clearly show that the 
increased housing costs of the plaintiff were reasonable, necessary, and unavoidable once 
the decision to remarry had been made. Compare Keith vs. Paden, (Ala., 19 51 ), 51 So.2d. 
9, wherein the court held that the loss of use of the house to the wife upon her 
remarriage, together with the fact that the children in her custody were three years older 
were, without more, sufficient change of circumstances to warrant an increase in the 
child support award. 
(c) Other Costs. Plaintiff's uncontroverted testimony and evidence definitely 
established that, in addition to basic housing costs of $6,729.36, she was spending a 
minimum of $4,400.36 per year on the children, or a total of $11,139.62. (T-83, 86, 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). If her mortgage payment were reduced by Y2, thereby bringing it 
into line with the amount defendant is paying for housing, (Defendant's Exhibit 3), she 
would still be paying $3,821.46 to purchase and maintain the home, in addition to the 
$4,400.36 per year she is spending for basic necessities such as food, clothing, medical 
care, and etc. (See Plaintiff's Exhibit "G"). Even at such a reduced cost for housing 
.,. (which the court said constituted the major item of increased living costs, T-176), 
plaintiff's total costs for supporting the three children is $8,221.82. Of that amount, 
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defendant is only paying $2,700.00, or approximately 33% (approximately 24% if the 
actual expenses of $11, 139.62 are compared), and allowed to claim the children for tax 
purposes as well. 
Over and above that, plaintiff supplies all of the love, caring, nurture, and etc. She 
is the one who must get them to the doctor when they are sick, attend school functions, 
bandage their physical and emotional hurts, see that they get their homework done, and 
etc. (See Womble vs. Womble, supra). 
(d) Inadequacy of Support Award. It is abundently clear from the record and 
without need for further argument, that the award of $75.00 per month for support of the 
children is inadequate by any standard or test. Defendant himself testified (T-136) that it 
required between $320.00 to $360.00 per month to support only one child while on his 
mission in the Chicago area. The members of this court are aware that such an award 
($7 5.00 per month) was a common award in the l 960's and early 70's when the average 
earnings of the father were $6,000.00 to $8,000.00 per annum. The court should also take 
notice of the Uniform Child Support Schedule Second Judicial District (5th revision 
1/28/82) which would award a minimum amount of support for the three minor children of 
$312.00 per month. See Appendix A herein. 
As any practicing attorney would know, many considerations go into the provisions 
of a divorce decree concerning support, alimony, and the like. Of times the husband is 
unable to provide an adequate support at the time, the needs of the children are not so 
great because of their tender age, and etc. By the same token, most attorneys engaged in 
the practice would likely counsel their client that as the children grow older, the income 
of the father increases to the point where he could provide an adequate support, and etc., 
that the court would entertain a motion to increase the support. Also, where actual 
experience demonstrates that the award (even if considered adequate at the time) turns 
out to be inadequate, the court should increase the support where the husband has the 
ability to pay. See for example the case of LeBus vs. LeBus (Ky., 1966), 408 S.W.2d. 200, 
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where the mother filed for an increase nine months after the divorce where her actual 
experience showed that the amount of support awarded to her by stipulation, was, in fact, 
inadequate. The court said that the necessary change of circumstance had been shown 
when subsequent events indicated that the award of support was induced by the 
misconception of the mother that she could get by on $200.00 per month per child. 
The principle is applicable to the plaintiff in this case. Whatever her expectations 
may have been at the time she agreed to accept $7 5.00 per month per child, plaintiff's 
subsequent experience has shown that to be a wholly inadequate award. She is spending 
her entire net income of $5,165.16 (Plaintiff's Exhibit A), plus the $2,700.00 she is 
receiving from the defendant to support the children, and still coming up short $3,274.46 
($11,139.62 total expenses attributable to the children per plaintiff's exhibit G, less her 
$5,165.16 net income and the $2,700.00 received yearly from the defendant, leaves a net 
deficiency of $3,274.46). Both the children and the plaintiff are entitled to better 
treatment from the defendant and from the courts. 
(e) Father's Ability to Pay. In 1978, when the divorce was granted, defendant 
agreed to pay a total of $500.00 per month alimony and child support (R-217, 218), and he 
had an income of $15,313.40. (R-366). In other words, he was then able to pay 
approximately 4096 of his gross income to support the plaintiff and her children. In 1981, 
after receiving cost of living increases bringing his yearly income to $19,000.00 (R-366) he 
makes the ridiculous claim that he cannot even afford to pay a total of $225.00 per month 
or 14% of his income to support his children. (T-119, 120, 123). 
Plaintiff maintains that defendant has demonstrated in the past the ability to pay 
$500.00 per month, because he actually paid it at a time when his income was 
substantially lower. His income having increased by $3,684.60 represents a 2496· increase 
over the three year period, roughly matching the general rise in the cost of living. 
Assuming a 24% increase in his ability to support his children, he should be able to 
increase his total support by 2596 to $600.00 per month, exactly what was requested by 
the plaintiff herein. ($500.00 + 2596 increase = $600.00 or $200.00 per month per child). 
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Any increase in defendant's costs occasioned by his remarriage are voluntary 
increases willingly accepted by him. Although those circumstances should be considered 
by the court (see Openshaw vs. Openshaw, Utah, 639 P.2d. 177), they are not properly 
permitted to supplant the primary obligation to take care of his first family. The case of 
Beck vs. Jaeger (Ariz., 1979) 604 P .2d. 18,. is instructive on this point. In that case the 
trial court had determined that the children's minimum needs were $300.00 per month, 
that the father had present earnings of $15,500.00 to $16,500.00 per year, and that the 
wife was earning approximately $600.00 per month. (It sounds almost like the situation in 
the instant case). Based upon those circumstances, the trial court increased the support 
award from $125.00 per child to $225.00 per child per month. Defendant appealed and the 
appeals court sustained the trial court, and made the following pertinent observations: 
"It is a matter of common knowledge that the cost of living has 
substantially increased since 1 97 3." 
"Inasmuch as ex-husband's ability to pay more child support was shown, it 
was proper for the trial court, in proceeding on ex-wife's petition for an 
increase in child support, to consider the increase in the general cost of living 
as a factor in determining the need for increased support payments." 
"Other financial obligations are secondary in the court's determination of 
ability to pay child support." 
"While the earnings of petitioner's present husband were not insubstantial, 
that fact had no bearin on the obli ation of etitioner's ex-husband to su ort 
his children." Emphasis added • 
A very extensive annotation covers the question of modification of child support in 
.... 
89 A.L.R., 2d. On page 61 the annotator makes the following statement concerning 
grounds for increase in payments and costs of support generally: 
"It is generally held or recognized that where the cost of supporting 
children has substantially increased since the entry of a support decree, an 
application for an increase in support payments may be granted, provided the 
father has the ability to pay more than the amount originally allowed." 
Among a long list of cases cited from 28 states in support of the proposition, the 
annotator lists the Utah cases of Craven vs. Craven (1951), 119 Utah 476, 229 P.2d. 301; 
Carlton vs. Carlton (1956), 4 Utah 2d. 332, 294 P.2d. 316; and Erickson vs. Erickson 0959), 
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8 Utah 2d. 381, 335 P.2d. 618. It is interesting to note that in the Erickson case the ex-
husband was ea.rning only an adjusted gross income of $11,325.00 per year, and the court 
had substantial doubts about the good faith of the ex-wife. Still, the court approved an 
increase from $150.00 for each of two children to $225.00 per child. Under the 
circumstances, is not the judicial conscience shocked where Mr. Shaw, earning $19,000.00 
per year is permitted to pay only a measly $75.00 per child for each of three children? He 
is paying as much for three children as Erickson was paying for one, and earning almost 
double the amount. To add insult to injury, he is then allowed by the decree to claim the 
three children as dependants for income tax purposes. How unfair can it be??? 
If the court verily believes that defendant cannot pay an adequate child support out 
of current earnings, then the court should award some or all of his share of the proceeds 
from the sale of the house to the plaintiff in order to provide an adequate level of 
support. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DIVISION OF THE PROCEEDS FROM THE 
SALE OF THE REAL PROPERTY 
APPLICABLE FACTS. A reading of the decision of the trial court as announced 
from the bench, particularly the portion dealing with the credits back and forth to the 
plaintiff and defendant for unpaid support, adjustments for costs of fix-up on the real 
property, adjustments for rent received by the plaintiff on the property, and etc.,will 
demonstrate that the court was utterly confused and, in the process, confused counsel for 
both sides. See for example T-179 to 186 where the court attempted to determine the 
proper credit to be given for the month of August, 1980. (In his confusion he awarded 
defendant $125 credit rather than the proper amount of $25 -- a 500 96 error). 
Out of all the confusion, however, the court eventually made findings (R-367, 368), 
and entered its order (R-373, 374), to the effect that the plaintiff was entitled to a net 
credit of $713.71 (it should be $813.71), which was to be paid first to the plaintiff out of 
the proceeds of the sale, and the balance divided between the parties. 
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CREDIT TO PLAINTIFF. After determining that the plaintiff was entitled to 
$713.71 for unpaid child support, fix-up costs, driveway repairs, and etc. (R-367, 368, 373, 
374), the court then proceeded to dilute the award by one-half -- in effect requiring the 
plaintiff to pay herself one-half of the amounts found to be due to her from the 
defendant. The court accomplished this feat by ordering that she first be paid $713.71 out 
of the proceeds of the sale and that the balance of the funds then be divided between the 
parties. (R-374). Since, by virtue of the divorce decree (R-217), plaintiff was entitled to 
one-half of the proceeds in any event, and without reference to anything owed to her by 
the defendant, it is apparent that by paying her first out of the fund, and then dividing the 
balance, one-half of the amount so paid comes out of her share. For example, let us 
suppose that there was $34,000.00 to be divided between them" (Defendant testified, 
T-123, Defendant's Exhibit 6, to approximately $34,000.00 in the account). In that case 
each would get $17,000.00. If the parties had divided the fund without intervention from 
the court, and if after the distribution, plaintiff had brought an action against the 
defendant for unpaid support, and for other claims resulting in a judgment for $713.71, 
and if she then levied upon the bank account where the defendant had deposited his 
$17,000.00, it is obvious that she would take $713.71 from the account, thereby reducing 
the balance to $16,286.29. If she then added the proceeds from the levy to her account 
where she had deposited her $17,000.00, she would then have $17,713.71 in her account. 
The difference between her account at $17,713.71, and the bank account of the defendant 
at $16,286.29 would then be $1,427 .42, exactly double the credit awarded to the plaintiff. 
It is apparent that the court intended that plaintiff recover $713.71 from the 
defendant. It is equally apparent that the formula utilized by the court only recovers 
one-half that amount, or $356.85Y2. The court should either order that the proceeds be 
divided one-half to each party, and the defendant then pay to the plaintiff, out of his 
one-half, $713.71, or, in the alternative (which amounts to the same thing), plaintiff 
should first be paid $1,427 .42, and the balance then divided between the parties. 
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FIX-UP COSTS. The matter of the division of the proceeds from the real property 
was heard by the court over the objection of the plaintiff. (T-52, 53). For that reason, 
the court, at the conclusion of the trial, allowed the parties an opportunity to submit 
affidavits on the question of fix-up costs expended to get the property ready for sale. 
(T-179, R-350). Plaintiff submitted her affidavit (R-352, 353), wherein she claimed a 
total of $1,389.61 for which she should be reimbursed. Defendant thereafter filed his 
objection to the claimed expenses (R-348, 349), and plaintiff then filed a supplemental 
affidavit wherein she claimed reimbursement of $2,589.61. (R-358, 359). The trial court, 
without apparent rhyme nor reason ·disallowed certain items, such as insulation in the 
attic, labor contributed by plaintiff's family members, and etc., and only allowed her 
$503.93. (R-350, 368). 
Plaintiff submits that it would be very time consuming and difficult for this court to 
sort through the various claims and counterclaims relative to the fix-up costs. Inasmuch 
as there was never an evidentiary hearing on the question, plaintiff was deprived of her 
right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal. The court should, therefore, remand 
this case back to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the issue of credit to be 
allowed plaintiff for fix-up costs and expenses. 
POINT V 
THE FINDINGS, ORDERS, AND RULINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT ENTERED 
AFTER THE APPEAL HAD BEEN PERFECTED ARE ILLEGAL AND WITHOUT 
FOUNDATION. 
APPLICABLE FACTS. For a general review of the facts as they pertain to this 
point, please see pages 4 through 9 of the Statement of Facts herein. 
LACK OF FOUNDATION. One of defendant's lines of defense to the claims of the 
plaintiff was to attack the integrity and motives of the plaintiff's lawyer husband. See 
pages 4 through 9 of the Statement of Facts herein. The only witness produced by the 
defendant on that point, however, was the parties oldest son Richard, whose testimony 
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ultimately amounted to the fact that plaintiff's husband had stated that he was going to 
get an adequate child support from the defendant one way or another. (T-147, 148). 
Plaintiff herself testified to the fact that all statements by her husband referred to 
getting "it" meaning support, and that he never stated he was going to get the defendant 
or break him, etc. (T-154, 155). 
Res Adjudicata. Defendant, himself, therefore, placed the issue of plaintiff's 
bona-fides squarely before the court even after the court questioned the wisdom of 
involving the parties offspring in the litigation (T-142).i The court thereafter, in its 
findings, conclusions, and order made no ruling one way or the other regarding the 
bona-fides of the plaintiff's claims, and declined to award attorney fees to either party 
(R-361 to 37 5), in effect finding no merit to the defendant's claim of bad faith. Where 
the parties had an opportunity to present their case and judgment was rendered therein, 
the judgment is binding both as to those issues that were tried and to those that were 
triable in that proceeding, and the parties are precluded from further litigating the 
matter. (Belliston vs. Texaco, Inc., 521 P.2d. 379). Inasmuch as the court had in effect, 
found against the defendant on the issue of bad faith in its original findings, it cannot 
thereafter raise the issue again (especially without notice to the plaintiff), and on the 
same state of facts make a finding of bad faith as it has done in its Special Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, and in its Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause. 
(R-455, 477, 478, T-11). The doctrines of res adjudicata and collateral estoppel prevent 
the court or the defendant from re-litigating the bona-fides of the plaintiff or her lawyer 
husband as was done in the April 5, 1982 hearing. 
Court's Rulings Are Contrary to ALL of the Evidence. Plaintiff's counsel of record, 
Ronald R. Stanger, at all times relevant herein, was ill with pneumonia and unable to 
function effectively (R-417, 480), and hence did not communicate his objections to the 
defendant's proposed findings, conclusions and order prior to their submission to the court. 
Defendant's counsel submitted them to the court without notice of his intention to do so 
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(R-416), even though the court had instructed him to submit them to opposing counsel 
for approval. (T-198). The findings, conclusions, and order actually signed by the court 
(R-361 to 375) as prepared and submitted by defendant's counsel, contain numerous and 
significant provisions that are contrary to the announced decision of the court. For 
instance, in announcing its decision concerning a box of scouting materials which plaintiff 
sought to have returned to her the court stated (T-195) that: 
"Court's going to direct the plaintiff receive that box with the scouting 
equipment. If the defendant has anything in that scouting box that he wants, 
he can photograph it within the next months period of time, one month today. 
That should be delivered to the plaintiff." 
Almost in direct contradiction thereto, defendant's counsel prepared and the court 
signed an order as follows: 
" ••• defendant is ordered to provide to the plaintiff the Boy Scout materials 
which were the plaintiff's personal property, provided, however that either 
party may make arrangements to have the Boy Scout items copied within 30 
days from the date of this hearing, and make arrangements as to paying the 
costs." (R-369, 371, 374). · 
Another for instance: 
In stating its decision from the bench, the court observed that the general increase 
in the cost of living had increased plaintiff's costs of supporting the minor children. There 
was no mention of such in the findings submitted by the defendant's counsel, however. 
Many significant implicit issues were not addressed in the findings prepared by defendant's 
counsel. Plaintiff sought to have the findings and conclusions accurately reflect the 
decision of the court, and sought to have them specifically rule on significant implicit 
issues, and etc. (R-402 to 415). 
As a result of Mr. Stanger's illness, it became apparent that the time for appeal 
would run before plaintiff could submit her motion to vacate (R-399 to 401), and her 
proposed findings, conclusions, and order (R-402 to 415). Therefore, on March 3, 1982, at 
the request of and on behalf of Mr. Stanger, plaintiff's lawyer husband Robert Lord 
submitted to the court an ex-parte motion and order for extension of time to file the 
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appeal. (R-376, 377, 480, et. seq.). The extension was signed by Judge Cornaby on March 
3, and filed with the court the same day. (R-378). Contrary to later ruling by the court 
(R-456), no hearing time was set when the order was signed (R-481), and the court 
specifically, _as late as March 15, refused to set a hearing time in spite of pleas of urgency 
by Mr. Lord, acting at the request of Mr. Stanger, who was still ill. (R-481, 463). 
Upon the filing of plaintiff's motion to vacate, Mr. Stanger withdrew (R-380, 399), 
and Mr. Ronald C. Barker entered his appearance as counsel for the plaintiff, and 
requested an oral hearing on plaintiff's motions to vacate and etc. (R-379). Mr. Barker 
promptly came down with a severe case of the flu and was absent from his office from 
March 16 to March 26, and on various occasions thereafter. (R-465 to 468, 481, 482). On 
March 25, while plaintiff's counsel was still absent from his office because of illness, 
Judge Cornaby's clerk called and set a hearing time on plaintiff's motions for April .5, 
1982, one day past the last day for filing the notice of appeal pursuant to the extension 
signed March 3. (R-377, 482). Because he had been absent from the office due to illness, 
Mr. Barker reasonably assumed, after returning to work, that (contrary to the fact) the 
hearing time had been set by previous counsel, and that the plaintiff and her husband were 
aware of it. (R-466, 490). 
It is virtually impossible to detail all of the facts and the evidence pertaining to the 
question of who knew of what hearing, who failed to advise who of what, and etc., without 
incorporating into this brief all of the record and evidence pertaining thereto. Suffice it 
to say (a) that plaintiff, on March 3 in good faith obtained an unconditional extension of 
time in which to file her notice of appeal to April 4, 1982 (R-378), (b) that she, through 
her husband, attempted on April 15 to get her motion to vacate set for hearing and Judge 
Cornaby refused to calendar it at that time (R-470, 471, 480, 481), (c) that on March 25, 
the court called the office of plaintiff's substitute counsel who was absent from the office 
because of illness and set the hearing time for April 5, 1982, one day after the last day in 
which plaintiff could file her notice of appeal (R-37 8), (d) that plaintiff's counsel was 
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confused and believed that previous counsel had set the hearing and that plaintiff was 
aware of the scheduled date (R-466, 490), (e) that neither plaintiff nor her lawyer husband 
were aware that the matter had been scheduled (R-466, 481, 483), (f) that neither 
plaintiff, her husband, nor her counsel deliberately failed to notify the court or opposing 
counsel that the notice of appeal had been filed on March 2 (R-466, 483), (g) that plaintiff 
had no reasonable reason to believe she need give the court or opposing counsel any 
special notice of the filing of the appeal, (h) that contrary to the ruling of the court 
(R-456) the court did not schedule the hearing at the time the extension was signed on 
March 3, nor could plaintiff's husband have been aware of any supposed telephone calls to 
opposing counsel and etc., in order to clear the date (R-480 to 483), and (i) That the 
alleged call from the court to clear the date was, in fact never made on March 3, as the 
record of long distance telephone calls shows no calls to Mr. Thorne's office in Brigham 
City. (R- ). 
A careful reading of the record beginning on page 416 to the end will amply 
demonstrate that the special findings of the court (R-473 to 478), the supplemental order 
on order to show cause (R-453 to 455), the rulings (R-456, 457), refusing to give any 
consideration to plaintiff's objections to entry of the said findings and order (R-451 to 
454, 459 to 460), and all proceedings of the court in relation to the hearing on April 5, are 
totally contrary to the evidence, without foundation, and constitute a very significant 
abuse of discretion on the part of the court. At the very least, there is sufficient blame 
to be apportioned to the court itself (for the way in which it handled the scheduling of 
plaintiff's motion to vacate) which contributed to the confusion of all involved on 
plaintiff's side, that plaintiff, the most innocent of all, ought not to be penalized by an 
award of attorney fees when she does not even have sufficient income to support the 
minor children of the defendant as it is. 
Likewise, the very damaging statements made by the court in its findings, order, and 
rulings pertaining to Mr. Lord, who is neither a party to the action, nor an attorney of 
record, and therefore wholly defenseless in this matter, should be vacated and set aside. 
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VIOLATION OF RULES OF PRACTICE. The Special Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and the Supplemental Order on Order to Show Cause on their face, 
were signed by the court in violation of Rule 2.9 of the Rules of Practice, which require 
that proposed orders be served upon opposing counsel and that counsel shall have five days 
in which to object. The mailing certificate of the special findings (R-479), and of the 
supplemental order (R-455) certifies that copies were mailed to plaintiff's counsel on 
April 14. The orders were signed by the court just two days later on April 16, the same 
day that plaintiff submitted her objections thereto. (R-451). In spite of plaintiff's 
request for an oral hearing on her objections (R-451), the court summarily rejected her 
request (R-456, 457). The entire ruling (R-456, 457), is based upon false premises as 
follows: 
(a) The first sentence stating that plaintiff's objections were received April 19 is in 
error and is evident by simply looking at the date stamped thereon by the clerk of the 
court April 16. (R-451). 
(b) The hearing on April 5 was not set at the specific instance and request of the 
plaintiff, nor did she willfully choose to stay away from the hearing or to notify the court 
or counsel that she did not intend to proceed with her motion. (R-466, 481, 483). 
(c) The special findings of fact and conclusions of law do not correctly reflect the 
findings, and conclusions of the court. For instance, the findings and order prepared by 
defendant's counsel depart entirely from anything fairly to be implied from the proceed-
ings of April 5. Paragraph one of the conclusions of law (R-477), and paragraph one of the 
order (R-454), illegally attempt to modify the extension of time for the filing of the 
notice of appeal and condition it to require plaintiff to disgorge certain funds from the 
sale of the parties home in North Ogden. (R-454, 457). An examination of the clerks 
minute entry (R-458), and the relevant portions of the transcript of the hearing (small 
transcript 10 to 12), reveal a complete dearth of any such finding or ruling by the court. 
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(d) The statement that the court set a trial date of April 5 at the time it signed the 
extension order is wholly contrary to all evidence adduced, as is the statement that Mr· 
Lord was present, consented to the date, or that Carmon Long called opposing counsel in 
Mr. Lord's presence at that time. 
(e) The finding that "it is clear that all parties knew of the date and time of the 
hearing by either personal notice or notice by phone" is contrary to the evidence. 
With such a significant failure of the factual basis for the court's ruling it is 
abundantly clear that the failure to abide by Rule 2.9 was highly prejudicial to the 
plaintiff, and constitutes a material a·nd significant abuse of discretion by the court. 
Certainly plaintiff ought not to be penalized by an award of attorney fees, nor 
should her husband should not be libeled without opportunity for them to defend 
themselves. 
THE TRIAL COURT LOST ITS JURISDICTION AFTER THE FILING OF THE 
PLAINTIFF'S NOTICE OF APPEAL ON APRIL 2, 1982. Plaintiff filed her motion to 
vacate pursuant to Rule 60, (b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on March 23 (R-399). On 
April 2, she filed her notice of appeal (R-419). At that point the trial court lost all 
jurisdiction to proceed with a hearing on plaintiff's motions, or to make any supplemental 
orders or findings relative thereto. 
"The general rule is that an appeal or writ of error, when duly perfected, 
divests the trial court of jurisdiction of the cause and transfers such 
jurisdiction to the appellate court where it remains until the appellate 
proceeding terminates and the trial court regains jurisdiction. Having lost 
jurisdiction pending an appeal, the lower court may not proceed with the trial, 
hear a writ of error coram nobis requesting permission to withdraw a plea of 
guilty, permit intervention, allow amendments, or entertain a bill to review 
the judgment". 4 Am. Jur .2d. Appeal and Error, section 352. 
Once jurisdiction is divested by the taking of the appeal, the parties cannot, even by 
consent, reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal 
while it is still pending in the appellate court. Kinard vs. Jordan, 17 5 Cal. 13, 164 P. 891. 
To this same effect, see the case of Epps vs. Bryant (So. Carolina), 65 S.E.2d. 112, 
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holding that an appeal stays any further action in the court below relating to the order 
appealed from, and an order modifying the order on appeal by increasing a required 
undertaking was void. 
In the case of Mamer vs. Superior Court (Cal., 1940), 103 P.2d. 961, the supreme 
court of California had before it a situation on all fours with the instant case. Judgment 
had been entered against the plaintiffs by the trial court. Twelve days after entry of the 
judgment, plaintiffs filed their motion to set aside the judgment, and on the same day, 
filed a notice of appeal. The trial court refused to hear the motion on the ground that it 
had lost jurisdiction because of the appeal. The supreme court affirmed. Likewise see in 
the case of Goodwin Foundation vs. Riggs, et. al. (Florida, 1979), 374 So.2d. 1018, where 
the court held that "The trial court has no authority after a notice of appeal has been 
filed to change th~ status of a case or to interfere with the rights of a party under the 
judgment. The trial court retains jurisdiction of the cause only to correct the record and 
it may not take any action affecting the subject matter of the appeal." (Emphasis added). 
The Idaho court has also held that the trial court is divested of jurisdiction over the 
cause once an appeal has been taken. In the case of Dolbeer vs. Harten {1966), 417 P .2d. 
407, the court held that having lost jurisdiction pending appeal the lower court could not 
allow amendments and that it was error to enter a substituted and supplemental decree 
after the appeal had been taken. 
In the case of Smith vs. Kimball, (Utah, 1930), 280 P. 588, the Utah court recognized 
the effect of an appeal on the jurisdiction of the trial court. In that matter, after the 
appeal had been perfected, the appellee brought a contempt action in the district court to 
enforce the injunction, and held the appellant in contempt. The supreme court held that 
the district court had exceeded its jurisdiction where the appeal had been perfected, and 
supersedeas given. The court held that the trial court was wholly without jurisdiction to 
do anything at all pending the appeal. In the instant case, no supersedeas has been filed, 
but as was held in the case of Hidden Meadows vs. Dee Mill, et. al., (Utah, 1979), 500 
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P.2d. 1244, a supersedeas is not required of the plaintiff except for the purpose of 
preventing the lower court from taking action to enforce the judgment as it stood before 
the appeal. For all other intents and purposes, the trial court is divested of jurisdiction 
upon the filing of the notice of appeal., 
CONCLUSION 
(1) The alimony awarded to the plaintiff by the decree of divorce was $125.00 
payable for three years. Since the amount payable can be calculated with precision, and 
the decree does not provide for any contingencies upon which it would be terminated or 
upon which the amount payable could be extended, it is an award of alimony in gross, or a 
lump sume Utah, along with the great majority of states that have considered the 
question, has recognized the difference between permanent alimony indefinite in amount, 
and alimony payable for a limited time or lump sum. The latter (lump sum) award is a 
final judgment and a vested right of the plaintiff just like any other money judgment, 
constitutes a lien upon real property, cannot be modified by the court, and does not 
terminate upon the remarriage of the plaintiff. 
Regardless of what the intention of the parties may have been, they entered into a 
stipulation which provided simply for the payment of a fixed amount of alimony for three 
years. The stipulation was incorporated into the findings and the decree verbatim. There 
is no question that the judgment of the court did not, and was not intended to contain any 
provision that the alimony terminate upon remarriage. Since any presumed error would, 
therefore, be a judicial error and not a clerical error the decree cannot be modified 
pursuant to Rule 60 (a). By the same token, since it is a judicial error (if it is error at all), 
it must be corrected by a timely motion under Rule 60 (b). The defendant's motion 
coming more than two years after entry of the decree was not timely under the rule and 
the alimony provision is fixed, final, and subject to no modification by either the plaintiff, 
the defendant, or the court. 
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The order of the trial court modifying the decree to eliminate the alimony upon 
remarriage was illegal, improper, an abuse of discretion, and beyond the jurisdiction of 
the court. Plaintiff should be granted judgment for the unpaid alimony in the amount of 
$1,875.00 plus interest on each payment from the date it was due to the date of judgment. 
(2) The decree of divorce awarded the plaintiff custody of the then five minor 
children and provided for payment of $7 5.00 per month per child for their support. 
Plaintiff was also awarded the possession and use of the home as shelter for herself and 
the minor children until she remarried. In July of 1980, plaintiff remarried, thereby 
triggering the requirement that she sell the home and divide the equity with the 
defendant. In conformity with that requirement, with four minor children still living with 
her (including Neil who was about to turn 17), and with the expectation that the oldest 
child Rick, who was then 21 years old would also be living with her, plaintiff purchased a 
home in Salt Lake City. 
Plaintiff did not consent to the move by Neil into the home of his father, and did not 
agree to any substituted payment of the required child support for Neil. Even though 
plaintiff no longer had to purchase food and clothing for Neil, the bulk of the expense 
attributable to him continued just the same. The total support for the three remaining 
minors, even with Neil's portion apportioned to them would be only $300.00 per month, or 
an inadequate $100.00 per month per child. To deny plaintiff judgment for the paltry sum 
of $900.00 support for Neil which accrued between the time he moved in with his father 
and the time he reached his majority works a substantial injustice upon the plaintiff with 
no compelling equity requiring relief for the father. 
The plaintiff is, under Utah law, and the law of the great majority of the states, 
entitled, as a matter of law, to receive the support for Neil, even though he was fully 
supported by the defendant, until such time as the court effects a modification 
eliminating it. The payments that had accrued prior to the trial in December, 1981, had 
vested with the plaintiff and the court could make no order eliminating those vested 
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accruels. It could only make an order eliminating the support in the future. Plaintiff is 
entitled to judgment against the defendant for the sum of $900.QO plus interest, from the 
date each payment was due to the date of judgment. 
(3) There is no question but what the award of $75.00 per month per child is 
inadequate by any standard. The evidence fully demonstrated the need for an increase in 
the level of support and demonstrated the ability of the defendant to pay it. In 1978, 
when the divorce was granted, defendant was earning $15, 313.40 per year and paid a total 
of $500.00 or 3996 of his income to support the plaintiff and the minor children. Even 
though he had remarried, he was earning at the time of trial in December of 1981, 
approximately $19,000.00 and could well pay at least the same $500.00 per month to 
support the three minors remaining with the plaintiff that he had earlier paid at the time 
of the divorce. He had received a 2496 cost of living increase in his wages, and the overall 
cost of living had gone up 3096, reducing plaintiff's child support, in 1978 dollars to the 
equivalent of $52.50, a mere pittance. 
The plaintiff proved a sufficient change of circumstances, including her increased 
expense as a result of the requirement that she sell the house upon her remarriage, the 
overall increase in the cost of living, the increased costs of raising the boys as they grew 
older, the inadequacy of the award, and the overall unfairness of allowing defendant to 
pay merely $7 5.00 per month and claim the children as dependants for income tax 
purposes when the plaintiff was spending in excess of $300.00 per month to support them. 
Defendant was spending only 1496 of his income on their support while plaintiff was 
spending 16596 of hers. 
While the court should be very wary of changing property settlement awards and 
etc., the provisions for support and alimony should be readily subject to modification 
because of the rapidly changing and unforseen circumstances. Plaintiff should be 
awarded support in the amount of $200.00 per month per child, particularly when the long 
period of time since the plaintiff's motion to increase the support is considered. The 
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provisions awarding the right to either parent to claim the children for tax purposes 
should be eliminated and the parties left to their own devices vis-a-vis the Internal 
Revenue Service. 
(4) As was pointed out in the discussion of Point IV above, the award of $713.71 to 
the plaintiff should have been $813.71, and was diluted by one-half as a result of the 
courts order that she be paid first out of the proceeds of the sale. Inasmuch as she was 
entitled to one-half of the proceeds in her own right, the requirement that she be paid 
first, in effect, required her to pay herself one-half of the judgment which she was 
entitled to from the defendant. Plaintiff should be awarded $1,627 .42 from the proceeds 
of the sale before any division of the equity is effected. 
(5) The court proceeded to adjudicate the division of the proceeds from the sale of 
the house over the objections of the plaintiff that that issue was not properly and timely 
raised before the court. For that reason, affidavits were submitted after the trial 
relative to the actual expenses, credits and offsets to which the parties should be entitled 
for fix-up costs, or other expenses incurred by them which improved the value of the 
house. The court arbitrarily and without apparent rhymn or reason allowed certain 
expenses and denied others. The court denied plaintiff's claim for labor performed by her 
family, friends, and fiance, and denied her claim for insulation in the attic on the ground 
that it was not installed directly with a view to preparing the house for sale. 
Such denials are improper. Just as she should be allowed to recover the increased 
value of the house (at least to the extent of her costs) if she had added a room, built a 
patio, and etc., which increased the value of the house, she should be allowed to recover 
the costs of the insulation which, in this energy conscious era, obviously increased the 
value of the home for resale. 
Likewise she should be allowed the value of the labor which was performed by her 
friends and family. If the value was increased by their labor, which it obviously was, why 
should the defendant be granted a free ride. The court should grant plaintiff judgment for 
45 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
an additional sum of $2,085.68 ($2,589.61 requested by the plaintiff less the $503.93 
already awarded by the court). 
At the very least, this case should be remanded back to the trial court for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of credit to be allowed plaintiff for fix-up costs and 
expenses5 
(6) All orders, rulings, findings, conclusions, and etc., pertaining to the hearing of 
April 5, 1982, coming after the appeal had been perfected in this matter are invalid and 
should be vacated as beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and because they are wholly 
unsupported by the evidence. Plaintiff was not aware that the said hearing had been 
scheduled and did not deliberately fail to show up for the hearing. There is more blame 
for the mix-up to be apportioned to the trial court, because of the way he handled the 
scheduling to the plaintiff's motion, than there is to be affixed to the plaintiff and she, 
the most innocent of all concerned ought not to be saddled with a judgment for attorney 
fees when she does not have adequate monies to support the minor children as it is. 
The judgment for attorney fees was not granted as an equitable measure to provide 
the defendant with the means to prosecute his claims or defend his position. It was 
obviously awarded as a punishment and penalty for her presumed discourtesy to the court 
and the defendant. The irony is that the defendant was no worse off for plaintiff's failure 
to appear for the hearing than he would have been had she actually appeared. Because she 
did not appear, she lost on all counts. How could he expect any more than that if she had 
been there? Had she been there she might have won on one or more of the issues she was 
pressing and defendant, therefore, could very well have been worse off had she actually 
appeared for the hearing. 
And finally, much that is contained in the special findings and conclusions, the 
supplemental order, and in the rulings of the court are highly prejudicial to the reputation 
of plaintiff's husband, Robert L. Lord, who is not a party to the action, and not even an 
attorney therein. The court had no jurisdiction over him and could not properly make any 
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judgment concerning him. The question of good faith and etc., was not an issue which the 
plaintiff, her husband, nor her counsel could reasonably have foreseen would be involved 
in the April 5 hearing and they were, therefore, unfairly deprived of their day in court on 
those issues. If said orders and rulings are not vacated and set aside by this court, the 
matter should, at least, be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of plaintiff's good faith and the award of attorney fees. 
(7) And finally it is apparent that the prosecution of this matter has imposed a 
great hardship upon the plaintiff and caused her to incur attorney fees and other costs 
which she could ill afford to pay. Much of what plaintiff has sought in this case she was 
entitled to as a matter of law, such as the alimony, and the child support for Neil. The 
balance of her claims are reasonable and were instituted as a result of defendant's 
stubborn refusal to shoulder his fair share of the burdon of raising their minor children. 
Much of the expense has come about as a result of the insistance of the defendant's 
counsel upon attacking the integrity of the plaintiff and her husband, and as a result of 
the improper handling of proceedings by Mr. Thorne and the court after the trial. 
Plaintiff should be awarded her attorney fees and cost for all matters aris~ng since 
the trial in the amount of $4,500.00. If the court cannot fix an amount at this time, the 
matter should be remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing on the question of 
attorney fees. 
(8) In total then, plaintiff should be awarded judgment on her various claims as 
follows: 
(a) Unpaid alimony 
(b) Unpaid child support for Neil 
(c) Credit as awarded by the trial court 
(d) Additional credit to correct trial court error 
regarding apportionment of credit 
for the month of August 
47 
$ 1,875.00 
900.00 
713.71 
100.00 
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(e) Additional credit for fix-up costs 
(f) Attorney fees and costs 
TOTAL 
2,085.68 
4,500.00 
$10,174.39 
The court should either order the proceeds from the sale of the house equally 
divided, and the plaintiff then paid her judgment out of the defendant's half, or she should 
be paid $20,348.78 (plus interest) and the balance then divided equally between the 
parties. Either formula arrives at the same result. 
Plaintiff should, of course, also be awarded an increase in child support to $200.00 
per month per child. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lowell V., Summerhays 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
420 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 355-5200 
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I hereby certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing to be mailed to the office 
of Jeff R. Thorne, Attorney for Defendant, 3.5 First Security Bank Building, P.O. Box "F", 
Brigham City, Utah, 84302, this ___ day of October, 1982. 
SUMMERHAYS, RUNYAN and 
McLELLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
420 Contiental Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing postage prepaid to the 
office of Jeff R. Thorne, Attorney for Defendant, 35 First Security Bank Building, P.O. 
Box "F", Brigham City, Utah 84302 this ___ day of October, 1982. 
Secretary 
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